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Law makes a moral claim on citizens. When that claim may be
overridden by a more stringent moral claim has long been debated in the
literature of jurisprudence and political theory.' Several years ago, I
joined that debate, attempting to understand the classic responses in
philosophy and literature to the question of what is a citizen's political
obligation. My investigation brought me to conclude: (1) citizens have a
moral obligation to obey just laws, except in circumstances where civil
disobedience could be invoked. Then, even just laws-like those against
trespassing-could be thwarted in order to protest a serious moral wrong
in the body politic, so long as the protestors were non-violent and
accepted punishment for their illegal, but morally justified, acts;
(2) citizens do not have to be faithful to unjust laws, unless by their
unfaithfulness they led others into immoral behaviors or cause a harmful
civic disturbance-in short, certain obligations to others ought to take
precedent over the exercise of one's rights; and (3) if the law requires a
citizen to personally perform an unjust act, the citizen has a moral
responsibility to refuse.2
This article continues the investigation of the way law exerts its
moral claim on citizens. This time, however, the focus is on the citizen
in his or her unique role as juror. I hope to continue this inquiry in
* Emeritus Professor of Law and Emeritus Director, Center for Professional
Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1. The debate begins in the West with Socrates' refusal to disobey the law and
escape from prison. See Plato, Crito, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 69 (Hugh
Tredennick, ed., Harold Tarrant, trans., Penguin Books 1993). See, generally, Leslie
Green, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514 (Jules L. Coleman and Scott Shapiro eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2002).
2. See Robert P. Lawry, Ethics in the Shadow of the Law, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
655 (2002).
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subsequent articles by examining the political obligation of fidelity to the
law by citizens occupying two other roles: judge and lawyer.
Today there is a widespread and long-standing acceptance of the
proposition that juries only determine facts.3 The judge determines the
law, although the jury does bear the responsibility of applying the law to
the facts. This current division of labor has ancient roots. In his
influential Institutes, Sir Edward Coke wrote: "To a question of fact, the
judges do not answer; to a question of law, the jurors do not answer."4 In
the 17th and 18th centuries, English juries may well have had law-
determining functions. Juries certainly did have such authority in early
colonial history, and were "the final bulwark against tyranny imposed by
overzealous courts, parliaments, or rulers.",5 Of course, this was also the
reaction of an oppressed people, longing to break colonial chains. After
the revolution, however, when those same people obtained the power and
the right to govern themselves, the movement back to the function of
facts-for-juries, law-for-judges, was inexorable. Self-government was
surely one reason. As judges and lawyers became more educated and the
people more diverse, the very idea of the rule of law demanded a return
to the original English division of role responsibilities. As early as 1855
in Massachusetts, the matter was firmly settled by Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Commonwealth v.
Anthes.6  Although the death knell sounded in federal law with the
7Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Sparf and Hansen v. United States, as
early as 1835, Joseph Story "went to great lengths in rejecting the entire
notion that juries may decide questions of law."8
3. In the United States, only Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland, via their state
constitutions, give criminal jurors the right to determine the law as well as the facts. "In
all three states, however, judicial decisions have essentially nullified the constitutional
provisions." Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 911 (1944). See also
JEFFREYABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 62
(Harvard Univ. Press 2000). In his book, Professor Abramson cites several typical
statements found in juror's handbooks or in jury charges. For example, "The
Massachusetts Trial Juror's Handbook states that the jury 'decides the facts . . .' [but]
does not decide the rules of law to be applied to the facts of the case .... The judge tells
the jury the proper rules of law required to resolve the case." Id. at 63.
4. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 155b (4th ed. 1639), quoted in Matthew
P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WiS. L. REV. 377,
440, n.2 (1999).
5. NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JUROR'S NOTIONS OF THE LAW 30
(Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
6. See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. 185 (1855).
7. See Sparf & Hansen v. United Sates, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
8. Abramson, supra note 3, at 78. Story's opinion can be found at United States v.
Battiste, 24 Fed. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14, 545).
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On the other hand, it had been English law in criminal cases since at
least 1670 that the decision of the jury itself was unassailable. 9 No
sanction could be imposed on a juror for rendering their verdict, no
matter the reason or motive.'0 In Bushnel's case, Chief Justice Sir John
Vaughn overturned a lower court decision fining the jurors for rendering
a decision of acquittal in favor of religious dissenters, William Penn and
William Mead. '" The lower court had found the verdict contrary to the
evidence and to judicial instructions on the law.' 2  Thereafter, it was
solid law that acquittals are always "proper and final." This rule was
adopted in America in 1735 in the famous trial of publisher John Peter
Zenger, who was acquitted of seditious libel. 13 In civil cases, because
judges exercise much greater control over juries in a variety of ways, the
history is different and largely non-controversial.
14
Thus, at the present juncture in the history of the jury as a legal
institution, the political and moral debate seems to be largely over
nullification in criminal cases. That will be the subject of the rest of this
essay. I use the term "nullification" to mean the power of the jury to
disregard the judge's instructions on the law, refuse to apply those
instructions to the facts at hand, or even to deliberately find as fact that
which the jurors themselves do not believe to have occurred, simply in
order to acquit a criminal defendant. 15 Jurors have the power to nullify
the law but not the legal right to do so. 16 The current debate tends to
focus on whether the judge should instruct the jury about its power to
nullify or allow lawyers to argue for nullification.' 7 Of course, jurors do
9. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushel for Alleged Misconduct as a
Juryman, Howell's State Trials 6: 999-1026; Vaughn's Reports, 35, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006
(1670).
10. Anderson, supra note 3, at 72.
11. Id. at 1009.
12. Id. at 1006.
13. JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER, (Stanley Katz ed., 1963).
14. Although civil jury nullification does remain a distinct possibility, it is both
difficult to discern and less likely to occur, given the tools judges have to ensure that civil
juries adhere to their instructions. See, generally, Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1626-1657 (2001).
15. All of those possibilities, of course, are justified by some notion of justice or
common sense or common sense justice. See Finkel, supra note 5, at 22.
16. But see Abramson, supra note 3, at 62-63.
17. Compare Richard St. John, License to Nullify: The Democratic and
Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563 (1997)
(arguing against an explicit right and judicial instruction) with R. Alex Morgan, Jury
Nullification Should be Made a Routine Part of the Criminal Justice System, but It Won't
Be, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127 (1997) (arguing that judges should instruct juries on their
power to nullify, thus, transforming the power into a right). The standard judicial view is
quite clear and quite negative. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37
(1972). After recounting the history of the law and the issues contained in the debate,
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engage in nullification.' 8 How much and for what reasons are largely
debatable issues. 19 The question I want to examine, however, is not a
statistical or even a political question, but a moral one: what is the moral
responsibility of the juror when he or she is tempted to engage in
nullification? Does the special role of "juror" endow a citizen with more
or less of a burden to follow the law?
Arguably, the oath the citizen takes, as a juror, to apply the law as
the judge directs, pushes in the direction of a greater burden.20 However,
religious considerations aside, this oath is morally analogous to the
burden placed upon a citizen when he or she "consents" to the social
21contract. Whatever its place in consent theory, it is difficult to argue
that the oath, as a giving of a "promise" alone, can never be broken.22
Thus, we may be faced with the same question under a different form:
what are the conditions that allow the juror to either break his or her
promise to apply the law as the judge sets it out, or, in other words, what
conditions allow a citizen to violate the law, promise or no promise? A
promise to do something does add moral weight to an independent
obligation, but I will put that question aside in order to focus on my
primary concern: under what moral circumstances may a citizen-juror
set aside his or her obligation to apply the law as instructed by the judge?
The practice of nullification itself, of course, can be argued for or against
as a political matter, just as any "right" can. We value the legal right to
"free speech," although not all speech protected under the Constitution
can be morally justified in terms of its content.23 Just so, with the refusal
Judge Bazalon endorses the view of Judge Sobeloff in United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1979) (No. 855), that to allow a
judicial charge of nullification "risks the ultimate logic of anarchy." Dougherty, at 1133.
On the other hand, he agrees that jury nullification is sometimes warranted in the
"exceptional case." Dougherty, at 1135.
18. For example, in a poll taken a few years ago, 75 % of the 1,012 people
questioned said that, as jurors, they would do what they believed was right, regardless of
what a judge says the law requires. Jurors: A Biased, Independent Lot, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
2, 1998, (A.1) (col. 2).
19. In their famous study of The American Jury, Kalven and Zeisel found that less
than a quarter of the disagreements between judges and juries over verdicts were due to
jurors finding certain laws "too severe" to enforce. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 286-87 (1966).
20. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1206 (2005).
21. See Green, supra note 1, at 525-28.
22. As far back as the 13th century, Aquinas accepted as commonplace the idea that
you could break a promise where the result of keeping it would be far worse. His
example was that goods held by another in trust should not be restored to their lawful
owner, 'for instance if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country.'
Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law 66 (Regency Publ'g Inc. 1956).
23. Joel Feinberg, Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion, in Philosophy of Law
135, 143 (Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross, eds., 1975) ("The question of legal
permissibility should not be confused with that of moral blameworthiness."). In that
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of southern juries to convict white defendants of crimes against blacks, it
has been argued, "the moral case for [nullification] ... foundered and
sank over the issue of race.24 Maybe. Whether we think juries ought to
be told they have the power to nullify is a political matter. Under what
circumstances they may exercise that power, no matter how they come to
know they possess it, however, is a moral matter.
The route I shall take to examine this moral question is a bit
circuitous. I begin by analyzing the well-known short story, A Jury of
Her Peers,25 by Susan Glaspell. The story provokes us to think of the
citizen as juror, but does not deal straightforwardly with a literal jury. In
fact, the story deals with citizens, denied the right to sit on juries, who
nullify the law, thus becoming the symbolic jury for one of their peers.
This examination will allow me to transition from my position on a
citizen's obligation to the law to that of a juror's obligation to the law. I
will follow the analysis of that story with a description and analysis of an
actual case, State v. Hossack.26 I choose this case because it was the real-
life genesis of the fictional story by Susan Glaspell, who covered
Hossack as a young reporter many years before transforming it into
fiction. Finally, I will talk straightforwardly about the moral issues
involved in nullification.
II. A Jury of Her Peers
A Jury of Her Peers is a feminist paean wrapped inside a mystery
story. The story is set, for the most part, inside the kitchen of Minnie
Foster Wright, who, as we soon see, has been arrested and sits in jail for
the murder of her husband.27 The deceased was found the day before in
his own bedroom with a rope around his neck.28 Mrs. Wright claims
same article, Feinberg gives a classic example of a malicious utterance which has no
other purpose that to harm another (so, clearly immoral). It is not actionable as
defamation because it is true, and will otherwise be protected by the Constitution. Id. at
138-39.
24. Abramson, supra note 3, at 61.
25. A Jury of Her Peers was first published in the magazine, Everyweek, Mar. 5,
1917, at 42. It was preceded, however, by a play, Trifles, first produced in 1916, in
which Susan Glaspell told the identical story, albeit in a different genre. The story has
been frequently anthologized since its inclusion in The Best Short Stories of 1917 256
(Edward J. O'Brian ed.) (1918). See Marina Angel, Susan Glaspell's Trifles and A Jury
of Her Peers: Women Abuse in Literary and Legal Context, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 779, at 779-
80, n. 1-2 (1997). All references to the story in this article will be to its reproduction in
Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, in LAW AND LITERATURE: LEGAL THEMES IN SHORT
STORIES 122 (Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, ed., Whitston Publ'g Co.) (1995).
26. State v. Hossack, 89 N.W.1077 (Iowa 1902).
27. Peers, supra note 25, at 126.
28. Id. at 125.
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someone entered the house as they slept and committed the crime.29 She
did not wake up during its commission and told no one after she
discovered his lifeless body; she was sitting in the kitchen when a
neighbor, Mr. Hale, dropped by to see if Mr. Wright would agree to
share the cost of putting in a telephone line in the branch road, a
"lonesome stretch" shared by the Wright and Hale farms.3" At the
beginning of the story, the county attorney, the sheriff, and the sheriff's
wife, stop at the Hale farmhouse to have Mr. Hale accompany them as
they search for clues as to what happened to Mr. Wright.3' In the
interim, Mrs. Wright has been arrested and placed in custody.32 The
sheriffs wife, Mrs. Peters, asks that Mrs. Hale be with her as she locates
some things to bring to Mrs. Wright in her jail cell.33 The story is told
through a third-person omniscient narrator, but is filtered largely through
the consciousness of Mrs. Hale.
34
From the beginning, we find Mrs. Hale sympathizing with Mrs.
Wright, and annoyed and hostile to the men in the story.3 5 Although not
close friends, and initially wary of each other, Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters
quickly bond in their sympathy for Mrs. Wright and their hostility to the
men.36 Although ridiculed by the men for their concern with "trifles," it
is the women who find the most important clues concerning Mr.
Wright's death.37 The women conspire to conceal the evidence, no doubt
in the hope that Mrs. Wright is ultimately not convicted.38 The men are
ostensibly looking for evidence of motive, "Something to show anger-
or sudden feeling," and it is the women who discover such evidence.39
First, Mrs. Hale finds a dishtowel, half-clean, half-messy;40 then a
29. Id.
30. Id. at 124.
31. Id. at 122-123.
32. Id. at 126.
33. Id. at 123.
34. Id. at 122.
35. See id.
36. For example, the women suffered in silence as the men joked that women
concerned themselves with "trifles." Id. at 126. The hostility was further exacerbated
when Mr. Hale commented, "But would the women know a clue if they did come upon
it." Id. at 128. Mrs. Hale, "as if releasing herself from something strange" in the wake of
the departure of the men from Mrs. Wright's kitchen, "said testily" that she would "hate
to have men coming into my kitchen... snoopin' round and criticizin."' Id. Perhaps the
key paragraph occurs immediately after Mrs. Hale secretly criticized Mrs. Peters for not
caring about Mrs. Wright: "Then she looked again, and she wasn't so sure; in fact, she
hadn't at any time been perfectly sure about Mrs. Peters. She had that shrinking manner,
and yet her eyes looked at if they could see a long way into things." Id. at 129.
37. Id. at 126.
38. See id. at 134-35.
39. Id. at 130.
40. Id.
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sugar bucket and a "half-empty bag beside it."'41 It reminds her of her
own kitchen, when she was suddenly asked to ride out with the others to
the Wright's farm. She makes a direct connection to "(t)hings begun-
and not finished;, 42 but there is more. Mrs. Peters discovers that Mrs.
Wright was "piecing a quilt," but that the last bit of sewing was a
botch.43 "Why, it looks as if she didn't know what she was about," says
Mrs. Peters, although the other patches were sewn "so nice and even.,
44
At this point, there is a shock of recognition between the two women,
and Mrs. Hale immediately begins to undo the bad sewing, despite Mrs.
Peters' nervous admonition that they ought not "to touch things. 'a
Later, the men will joke that Mrs. Peters was "married to the law;" and
her initial misgivings were those of a woman who saw things from the
point of view of her husband, a lawman. 6 These initial misgivings
eventually give way to feelings of solidarity with Mrs. Wright and Mrs.
Hale, indeed with all women in the story.47 Mrs. Peters says to Mrs.
Hale toward the end of the story: "We all go through the same things-
it's all just a different kind of the same thing! If it weren't-why do you
and I understand? Why do we know-what we know this minute? '48
By this time they had found an empty bird cage with its hinge
roughly broken open; and then they found the conclusive piece of
evidence: Mrs. Wright's canary bird, dead in a little red box.49
"Somebody wrung its neck," Mrs. Peters said, "in a voice that was slow
and deep. 50 She remembered how, as a child, a boy had killed her kitten
with a hatchet, and how, "If they hadn't held me back I would
have.. .hurt him.' Each of the women, in a silent conspiracy, lied
about and concealed what they had found. In the end, Mrs. Peters tries
to hide the box containing the dead bird in her handbag-but the bag is
too small. 3 Just in time, Mrs. Hale grabs the box and shoves it into the
"pocket of her big coat., 54 They hide "the thing that would make certain




44. Id. at 131.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 136.
47. Id. at 135.
48. Id. at 135.
49. Id. at 133-34.
50. Id. at 134.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 137.
54. Id. at 137.
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yet who had been there with them all through that hour., 55
Not only had Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters been able to piece together
the evidence of what had triggered the strangling of Mr. Wright and the
fact that Mrs. Wright had done it, but they also figured out how such a
thing could occur.56 They knew some things pretty clearly. Mrs. Hale
knew the Minnie Foster (Wright) of twenty years ago to have been a
"lively" girl, who wore "pretty clothes" and who "sang in the choir."
57
Mrs. Hale recalled that Minnie "was kind of like a bird herself. Real
sweet and pretty, but kind of timid and-fluttery., 58 Together the two
women outlined a portrait of Mr. Wright, and what the life the Wrights
must have been like. Publicly John Wright was what people called a
"good man"-he "didn't drink.., kept his word as well as most ... paid
his debts., 59 At the same time he was a "hard man.... Like a raw wind
that gets to the bone., 60  He was miserly. The evidence here was
abundant. The stove was broken; Mrs. Wright wore "shabby" clothes;
6'
even the kitchen rocker, where Mrs. Wright must have often sat, "didn't
look in the least like Minnie Foster-the Minnie Foster of twenty years
before. It was a dingy red, with wooden rungs up the back, and the
middle rung was gone, and the chair sagged to one side. 62 Clearly, he
would not provide his wife with elementary things; necessary things like
a working stove and basic things like decent clothes. How much of this
was due to poverty, the story does not say. The story does say he was
"close, 63 and not mindful of Mrs. Wright's desires. Moreover, he was
taciturn, a man who did not like to talk or hear others talk64 Life on the
farm was very lonesome for Mrs. Wright 65 It was "not a cheerful
place"-which was why Mrs. Hale did not come to visit the Wright's
farmhouse.66 Mrs. Hale's knew Mrs. Peters understood much of what
Mrs. Hale saw and understood, when Mrs. Peters' lamented: "A person
gets discouraged-and loses heart.,
67
More than the above would be the reader's interpretive speculation,
rather than the reflections of the two women whose behavior is the focus
of the story. Did Wright physically abuse his wife? There is no direct
55. Id.
56. Id. at 128-130.
57. Id. at 129.
58. Id. at 133.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 129.
62. Id. at 124.
63. Used here to mean "cheap" or a "tightwad."
64. Id. at 137.
65. Id. at 124.
66. Id. at 127.
67. Id. at 130.
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evidence he did, neither woman even alluded as much 68 But they knew
he was capable of violent acts. They had good evidence he tore off the
door of the birdcage and "wrung the neck" of the bird with his bare
hands. 69 Did he psychologically abuse her? There is the evidence of his
unwillingness to have a telephone installed in his house.70  By this
refusal, he surely contributed to his wife's social isolation. It was also
clear, even to the other men, that "what his wife wanted did not make
much of a difference to" Mr. Wright. 71 His coldness and indifference, no
72doubt, were causes of psychic pain. How much? How deep was the
pain? Evidence that would help in answering those questions is scarce.73
I bring up the two abuse categories to set the stage for an analysis of the
moral arguments that might be made to justify the extraordinary actions
of the two, obviously otherwise good and decent, women. They hid
evidence relevant to a criminal proceeding and lied about it.74 They
broke the law. 75  Today, battered women's syndrome, used as a
justification, excuse defense, or in mitigation of murder, allows the
production of evidence of physical and psychological abuse.76 Morally,
it seems to me that evidence of a similar nature is-and always has
been-similarly relevant. If we begin with the proposition that citizens
are sometimes justified in breaking the law if the law is "unjust, ' 77 then
these issues must be probed in context. Moreover, the context itself must
be probed to examine the exact nature of the injustices that might provide
a justification or excuse, not just for Mrs. Wright's committing a
homicide, but a justification for the law breaking of Mrs. Hale and Mrs.
Peters. Obviously, however, the two are inextricably connected.
A. Was the Law Unjust?
Justified civil disobedience aside, generally speaking, a citizen has
an obligation to obey the law. However, under certain circumstances,
68. Id. at 122-23.
69. Id. at 135.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 124.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 135.
74. Id. at 136.
75. Surely the women understood that hiding or destroying evidence were law-
breaking activities. That is the ironic significance of the references to Mrs. Peters being
"married to the law." Id. at 136.
76. See Joshua Dressier, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters:
Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259, 260 & n. 11-12 (Stephen
Shute & A.P. Simester eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
77. See Lawry, supra note 2.
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perhaps a citizen may break an unjust law.78 Here the law broken by
Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters was not, on its face, even arguably unjust.
The prohibition on hindering the prosecution or conviction of an alleged
criminal is hardly an unjust law. We surely want the government to be
able to prosecute alleged criminals, and any civilized society will have
laws against interference with that task. Of course, if the crime, for
which the evidence is relevant to, is itself unjust, one could perhaps
legitimately piggy-back a violation of the innocuous law concerning
evidence destruction onto the unjust law in order to make a moral
argument. For example, if laws that allow people to be bought, sold, and
held in bondage are unjust, then laws, which are otherwise just but
directly support those laws, could surely be disobeyed. Thus,
manufacturing false identification documents for run-away slaves during
this country's ante-bellum period seems justified to me, even though the
law against manufacturing false official documents is, on its face, a good
one.
A word of caution is needed at this point. Aquinas made the
argument that citizens have no straightforward obligation to obey unjust
laws, except in two circumstances: (1) when it would produce a civic
disturbance; and (2) when it would cause "scandal," i.e., lead innocents
into moral wrong-doing. 79 Centuries before, Socrates had argued that a
citizen had an obligation to obey even an unjust law, when the result
otherwise would be to do a moral wrong.80 Aquinas was just putting
some exactitude into the Socratic admonition.81 Therefore, the piggy-
backing argument discussed above would have to meet the stringency
test articulated by Aquinas when citizens are considering disobeying any
unjust law.
How might this piggy-back analogy work in A Jury of Her Peers?
First, the problem is not with the basic law against murder or
manslaughter. Although the common law's "malice" was an imprecise
word, it generally meant "intentional" or "reckless," words which we
presently use in determining what the appropriate "guilty mind" ought to
be for us to punish severely for killings committed with that kind of mens
rea.82 Thus, the problem may be with the definition or application of the
defenses to murder or manslaughter. Successful defenses are generally
either "justified," i.e., considered, on balance, a social good; or
"excused," i.e., not socially desirable, but, focusing on the particular
78. Id.
79. Aquinas, supra note 22, Q. 96, art. 4, at 97.
80. Plato, supra note 1, at 91.
81. See Lawry, supra note 2, at 678-81.
82. See Model Penal Code § 210 and accompanying commentary (1962).
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individual and not the act itself, not socially blameworthy either.83 Moral
"defenses" may be similarly categorized. Indeed, the criminal law and
the moral law ought to be consistent in categorizing defenses, even if the
actual rules may not be so.
84
In terms of justification arguments, the most plausible would be
self-defense. The argument will go nowhere, however, without some
physical threat to Mrs. Wright. Even under current Model Penal Code
standards, there is no right to kill in self-defense unless the lethal
response was "necessary to protect ... against death, serious bodily
harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse by force or threat."85 A Jury of
Her Peers may indicate symbolically through the bird's broken neck that
John Wright was physically abusing his wife; but would the two women
themselves be justified in assuming that that was the case? 86 Increased
understanding of battered women has led to some movement in the law,
even excusing some women for murdering their sleeping husbands, for
example, if the threat of physical harm was constant and would
presumably resume when he awakens.87 Nevertheless, that question of
timing does not change the underlying necessity for the killer to be under
a serious threat of physical attack or physical confinement in order for
the killing to be justified. Morally, I would suggest that this should have
always been the case; but the question that baffled male judges in early
battered women syndrome cases looms large here: why did she not
simply leave? 88  Surely we still would not want to condone "self-
defense" when a woman who is fearful for her physical well-being can
retreat to safety. 89 Theorists of battered women syndrome argue that
women who are battered often exhibit a "learned helplessness" that
makes them believe they cannot escape, or that, if they try to, the batterer
83. See Dressier, supra note 76, at 205-19.
84. As Henry Hart put it: what distinguishes criminal conduct from non-criminal
conduct is "the formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community." See Henry Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 405 (1958), reprinted in A CRIMINAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 1, 3 (Arnold H.
Loewy ed., Anderson Publ'g Co. 1992).
85. Model Penal Code §3.04 (2)(b) (1962).
86. There is certainly no textual evidence that the woman thought Wright was
physically abusing his wife.
87. See Dressler, supra note 76, at 260 n. 11 and cases cited.
88. The answer given is usually "learned helplessness." As an early study put it: "A
battered woman often believes that the batterer is omnipotent, that no one can help her,
and thus she limits the number of responses she feels are possible or safe to make."
Lenore E. Walker, Roberta K. Thyfault, and Angela Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken:
Battered Woman, 7 VT. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1982).
89. Although "American jurisdictions are sharply split on the issue of retreat," those
that favor a no-retreat rule usually do so on the grounds that "the manly reaction to an
unlawful attack is to stand one's ground." Dressier, supra note 76, at 227. Not only is
this a sexist doctrine, it is clearly one that diminishes respect for human life. Id.
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will find them and drag them back.90
This is analogous to a situation where a person is imprisoned, and
cannot escape except by killing their jailor, who is temporarily distracted
or even asleep. A kidnapped victim surely has the moral right-and
even the legal right under the Model Penal Code-to kill her jailor if the
opportunity arises, and only the jailor's death will enable her to escape.9 1
Is this the situation with Mrs. Wright? Maybe. Again, the story does not
say so, but we might want to add some pertinent background about life
on a Midwestern rural farm at the turn-of-the-century. Firstly, there is
the almost absolute economic dependency of the farm-wife on her
farmer-husband.92  Secondly, there is the difficulty of divorce, again
economically, but also socially, for women who lived this kind of hard,
isolated life.93 The problem is, what we know generally may or may not
apply with poignant particularity to Mrs. Wright's case. We know from
the story she wore "pretty clothes," was "lively," and that she sang in the
"choir" when she was young.94 Was there no one in the community who
would or could help or support her? The story tells us so little about this
crucial fact. We do know that Mrs. Hale thought she, as a neighbor and a
woman, should have offered Minnie Wright some support and friendship
through the years. My reading of the story is that Mrs. Hale's feeling of
guilt was why she instinctively defended Minnie Wright before she knew
anything about what happened. 95 Moreover, it was the key reason she
90. See id. at 260 n. 11 and cases cited.
91. Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b) says explicitly that killing in self-defense is
justified if "necessary to protect.., against.., kidnapping" and some few other things
("death, serious bodily harm... or sexual intercourse by force or threat." See Gregory
A. Diamond, Note, To Have But Not To Hold: Can "Resistance Against Kidnapping"
Justify Lethal Self-Defense Against Incapacitated Batters?, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 729, 736
(2002).
92. See Elaine Hedges, Small Things Reconsidered: Susan Glaspell 's "A Jury of Her
Peers," 12 WOMEN'S STUDIES 89, 92 (1986) (Professor Hedge's article is a well-
documented effort to "uncover... the dense, hidden background reality of rural women's
lives," which she then ties to specific details in Peers. The terrible isolation and real
poverty of Mrs. Wright's existence is deftly shown by this "hidden underground
reality.").
93. The economic and social difficulties for married women, trying to separate from
their farmer-husbands, was aptly summarized by a leading authority on the Hossack case
as follows: "According to reports from neighbors and her children, Mrs. Hossack talked
many times about her wish to live separately from her husband. Two neighbors were to
testify at her trial that Mrs. Hossack said she would have separated from her husband
years ago, except for the disgrace she knew it would cause for her family. Mrs. Hossack
was, of course, economically dependant on her husband: the property was in his name."
Patricia L. Bryan, Stories in Fiction and in Fact: Susan Glaspell's A Jury of Her Peers
and the 1901 Murder Trial of Margaret Hossack, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1321 (1997).
94. Peers, supra note 25, at 129.
95. Her feelings of guilt were evidenced early in the story when Mrs. Hale felt she
could not cross the threshold of Minnie Wright's house "because she hadn't crossed it
before." Id. at 123.
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hid the evidence that "would make certain the conviction" of Mrs.
Wright.96 In near despair, Martha Hale cries out: "Oh, I wish I'd come
over here once in a while .... That was a crime! That was a crime!
Who's going to punish that?"97 Mrs. Hale's guilt feelings tell us little,
however, about the conditions of psychic imprisonment that Mrs. Wright
may have experienced. If she was physically imprisoned by Mr. Wright,
then I think she would have been justified in killing her husband-jailer,
just as much as a person who was wrongly physically imprisoned under
lock and key would have the moral right to kill the one who deprived her
of her liberty.98 Thus, under the circumstance of wrongful physical
imprisonment, surely killing to escape would be justified.
If the imprisonment is physical only, perhaps killing to escape
would still be morally excusable, even if the criminal law has not
reached that conclusion.99 Being imprisoned is a well-accepted excuse
for killing under the criminal law. 00 Nevertheless, I see no essential
moral difference between a physical imprisonment and a psychic one. A
physical cage or a psychic cage equally prevents a person from engaging
in normal acts of free will. Any human being who has his or her liberty
so curtailed is surely entitled to escape. So, if the only way a person who
is imprisoned can be freed is by killing the jailer, then that act should be
a morally justifiable one, whether the confinement is physical,
psychological or partakes of both. The closest hint we have in A Jury of
Her Peers that Mrs. Wright was truly imprisoned is when Mrs. Peters
says: "A person gets discouraged-and loses heart." This is said after
the two women discover that Mrs. Wright's stove was broken, thus
making it very difficult to perform one of her essential jobs-cooking
food. This statement comes directly after Mrs. Peters says with some
resignation that the men must search Minnie Wright's house for clues
concerning the crime for "the law is the law." And Mrs. Hale retorts:
"and a bad stove is a bad stove." 101 What does this add up to? I am not
sure, but I think it quite a stretch to suggest it adds up to the two women
believing Mrs. Wright was physically trapped, although just maybe
Susan Glaspell wanted us to entertain that possibility. On the other hand,
there may have been an underlying presumption, built into the story, that
farm wives in rural communities in the early twentieth century were
96. Id. at 137.
97. Id. at 135.
98. A person is guilty of kidnapping under the Model Penal Code if he or she
"unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation... to inflict
bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another." Model Penal Code § 212.1 (1962).
99. See Diamond, supra note 91, at 759-62.
100. Model Penal Code, § 3.04(2)(b).
101. Peers, supra note 25, at 130.
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psychically and physically trapped in their lives. This presumption is
both confirmed and challenged by the real events that became the
catalyst for A Jury of Her Peers. A fuller discussion of this question
will, therefore, be postponed until that real situation is explored.'0 2
A second "excuse" defense that may have been available to Mrs.
Wright might be "temporary insanity." The current MPC definition of
insanity excuses responsibility for a crime to one who "as a result of
mental disease or defect ... lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [i.e. wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law."' 10 3 In the infamous case
People v. Hughes, Francine Hughes10 4 was held to be not guilty by
reason of insanity, when she burned down the house in which her
drunken ex-husband slept, killing him. He had physically and
psychologically abused her for years, and, although he had threatened to
kill her that very day unless she quit school or if she ever left him, his
threat to kill was not "imminent."105 Although urged by some feminists
to argue self-defense, the lawyer for Mrs. Hughes chose to argue
"temporary insanity" instead because of concern over the issue of
imminence. 0 6  Such a defense necessarily means the introduction of
medical testimony, obviously not available to Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters.
Nevertheless the judgment whether a person is "insane," and thus
excused from criminal responsibility, is a layperson's judgment. It is a
judgment made by a juror, translating scientific or medical evidence into
a moral judgment regarding blameworthiness, or ignoring such evidence
as unconvincing. 0 7 In the story itself, after Martha Hale observed that
Mrs. Wright was going to bury the dead bird in a "pretty box" because
she had affection for it, Mrs. Peters recalls an incident from her
childhood, and the vivid emotion of that day re-visits her:
'When I was a girl,' said Mrs. Peters, under her breath, 'my kitten-
there was a boy that took a hatchet and before my eyes-before I
could get there,'-she covered her face for an instant. 'If they hadn't
102. See infra notes 143-160 and accompanying text.
103. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1962).
104. For the full story of this case, made into a TV movie starring Farah Fawcett, see
FAITH MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED: THE TRUE STORY OF AN ABUSED WIFE (1980).
105. The traditional need for imminence was the central issue in the horrific abuse
case of State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253 (1989), which has given rise to a voluminous
literature, mostly condemning the tradition. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, On Self-
Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1993).
(Note that the need for the threat of death or physical abuse to be imminent had been a
traditional one in self-defense law and is clearly tied to the sound social policy
encouraging potential victims to retreat or escape rather than kill.).
106. See McNulty, supra note 104, at 203.
107. See, Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 25.01 (4th ed. 2006).
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held me back I would have.., hurt him'.
10 8
Because Mrs. Peters can remember "snapping" as a young girl, she could
readily imagine Mrs. Wright snapping too-pushed over the edge, into
what? Insanity? Historically we know many farm wives at that time did
suffer serious mental breakdowns. Thus, given this history and the
burdens of her terribly lonely life, was the killing of Mr. Wright not only
understandable, but even excusable? At least, should we not see that
Mrs. Wright was "provoked" so as to lose her own use of reason or self-
control? In traditional criminal law terms, such provocation would at
least mitigate the offense from murder to manslaughter.10 9
Those are the kinds of arguments a jury might hear in the
hypothetical State v. Wright, but, of course, these arguments-and the
facts assembled to support them-were, at best, only fragmentarily
available to Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters. They had to react quickly as
their instincts directed them during that small space of time when they
were alone in Mrs. Wright's kitchen. Moreover they discovered the
information piecemeal, as the men of the law wondered into and out of
their space. Under the facts "found" by the two women, should a real
jury convict? Exonerate? Nullify? The questions seem absurd. The
women themselves hastily assembled the prosecution's case and reacted
defensively to it. Who knows what facts might have been developed for
use at a real trial? Or what theories developed in defense? Here, of
course, is the root of the moral problem: Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters
determined that certain relevant facts would not be available to convict
Mrs. Wright at her trial. It was a rush to judgment; but, in the end, their
actions were defensible or not defensible as a moral matter, depending on
two things: (1) the underdeveloped state of the law regarding defenses to
murder; and (2) the fact that no jury assembled to judge Mrs. Wright
could have had a woman on it."0  Although both are potentially
arguments about justice, the second perhaps enfolds the first. In any
event, the second argument was the heart of the matter for Susan
Glaspell. She called the story A Jury of Her Peers,' and the story itself
108. Peers, supra note 25, at 134.
109. See Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (1962). The MPC abandons the use of
provocation terminology to rid itself of out-dated common law categories, but the basic
idea remains constant.
110. The history of excluding women from juries is succinctly told in Joanna L.
Grossman, Note, Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference,
46 STAN L. REV. 1115, 1131-60 (1994).
111. As contrasted with the title she gave to her initial attempt to tell this story,
Trifles, a play that "emphasized the household items from which the two women deduce
the full story of the crime," the title, A Jury Of Her Peers, "calls attention to women's
legal place in American society at a time when they were unable to vote and considered,
under the law, to be inferior to men." Bryan, supra note 93, at 1306, n. 44.
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is a demonstration of the ignorance and insensitivity of men, their
complete lack of understanding of who Mrs. Wright was, and what she
suffered at the hands of her cold-hearted husband. 1 2  Hiding the
evidence of a "motive" at least evened the odds that perhaps the actual
jury impaneled in this case would show some paternalistic sympathy
toward the defendant, perhaps engage in jury nullification or simply
exonerate her." 3 The need for evidence of a motive was felt strongly by
the county attorney. Without such evidence, a conviction was not at all
certain. "[I]t's all perfectly clear," he said, "except the reason for doing
it. But you know juries when it comes to women."'"14 Apparently all-
male juries at that time were quite willing to exonerate women who
killed their men, so long as the women seemed "female" enough, that is,
meek and submissive. 1 5  Mrs. Wright probably fit the stereotypical
image."16 Something like "insanity" may have actually won the day for
her, at least it might have given the jury something upon which to hang
its not guilty verdict. Perhaps Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters instinctively
thought this could be the case. Even more likely, without a "motive," an
all male jury in those days might easily have allowed themselves to
believe that this meek and submissive woman was not capable of killing
her husband and, thus, did not. Remember, Mr. Wright was strangled
with a rope, not an easy task for a person less physically strong than the
victim. Regardless of the defenses available to Mrs. Wright, the moral
question remains: was it appropriate for Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters to
take these matters into their own hands?
From the published literature on the story, it seems only a gnomic
male would even ask the question. 1 7 Minnie Wright may or may not be
guilty of murder or manslaughter under the law-then or now. She may
or may not have been able to get a "fair trial"-at least then, maybe now
too. All of that is irrelevant; for, unless the unknown evidence was
112. The story is filled with these demonstrations. For example, Mr. Hale
insensitively mocks the women early on, with the question, "But would the women know
a clue if they did come upon it?" Peers, supra note 25, at 128.
113. Male juries at that time "were particularly lenient with female defendants,
especially those who were extremely feminine in manner and who behaved as women
were expected to behave." Bryan, supra note 93, at 1332-33 & n. 221 (citing Ann Jones,
Women Who Kill 98, 104 (1991)).
114. Peers, supra note 25, at 136.
115. Bryan, supra note 93, at 1332-33.
116. Hale described the young Minnie Wright as a girl who "used to wear pretty
clothes and be lively-when she was Minnie Foster, one of the town girls, singing in the
choir." Peers, supra note 25, at 129.
117. The scholarly work has been overwhelmingly done by women, who are
universally sympathetic. See Bryan, supra note 93, at 1294; see also sources cited supra
note 6.
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shockingly surprising, 118 this is a case where jury nullification at least
might be expected. Mrs. Wright poses no further threat to society. She
was a broken woman, not likely to mend; and her husband was
responsible for her brokenness. Wasn't it so? Even if the act would not
be legally justified or excused, the conscience of the community could
say: "Let her go. She has suffered enough."'19 But is that answer good
enough to exonerate Mrs. Peters and Mrs. Hale for "their" law-breaking?
To address that question, I turn now to an analysis of the case that Susan
Glaspell used as a starting point in creating her story.
B. State v. Hossack
Can a case be made that jury nullification would have been morally
appropriate in State v. Hossack? We might begin by asking what we
know about the circumstances of Mrs. Hossack's life compared to those
of the fictitious Mrs. Wright. Here are the facts of the murder and
background circumstances, as we know them from the appellate opinion
in the case, supplemented by newspaper reports and some general
sleuthing done by Professor Patricia Bryan in the 1990,s.120
John Hossack "was killed in his bed on the night of December 2d of
the year 1900. He received two blows, either of which was sufficient to
cause his death."'' A sharp instrument opened a five-inch gash in his
skull. 122 A blunt instrument crushed the skull right below the gash.'
23
Mrs. Hossack testified that on that fatal night, "she and her husband went
to bed together; she lying in the front."'124 Mrs. Hossack claimed "she
was roused from her sleep after midnight by a noise such as would be
made by striking two boards together."'125  When she got up to
118. How anyone could have put a rope around Mr. Wright and strangled him without
waking Mrs. Wright, who was sleeping next to him, defies rational explanation. Peers,
supra note 25, at 125-26 ("We may have looked as if we didn't see how that could be, for
after a minute she said, 'I sleep sound."').
119. In the Burning Bed case, the jury exonerated the defendant on the tenuous
ground of "temporary insanity." See, McNulty, supra note 104. Sometimes, it is the
State that extends a generous plea bargain, after conviction and reversal, presumably as a
way of saying "enough." After receiving a sentence of 2-6 years on a first degree
manslaughter conviction, Leslie Emick, who shot her sleeping husband 5 times in the
head, was allowed to plead guilty to "second degree manslaughter and was sentenced to 5
years probation plus community service." Charles P. Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense:
A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who Kill, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 579, 580
n.2 (1990).
120. State v. Hossack, 89 N.W. 1077 (Iowa 1902); Bryan, supra note 93.






PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
investigate, she heard the front door close. 126 Then she heard groans
from her husband, called several of the children down from their
bedrooms upstairs, investigated, and found her husband bleeding from
the two blows previously described. 127 He died some hours later. 28
At the time of John Hossack's death, he and his wife had been
married for thirty-three years. 29 They had nine children, five of whom
were still living at home. 30 The court found that: "The family life of the
Hossacks had not been pleasant, perhaps the husband was most to blame.
He seems to have been somewhat narrow-minded, and quite stem in his
determination to control all family matters."' 3 1 Neighbors testified that
for years Mrs. Hossack complained to them about his violent temper.'
32
Once she asked a neighbor to come to her house to "quiet her husband,"
who she feared would kill one or more family members. 33 When the
man said he wouldn't touch Hossack, she replied: "I don't want you to
touch him unless you finish him."' 134 Furthermore, "[s]he complained at
times that he had used physical violence to her, striking her with his hand
and with a stove lid."' 35 One year before Hossack's death, Mrs. Hossack
"left the home, and went to the home of a married daughter."'1
36
Neighbors effected reconciliation, although that same night in which
husband, wife, and children agreed to live peacefully thereafter, Mrs.
Hossack "privately requested one of the neighbors to remain all night,
expressing the fear that her husband would make trouble again as soon as
they were gone."'' 37 Two months after the reconciliation, a neighbor
testified that Mrs. Hossack told her "[ilt is just as bad as it ever was.' 3 8
That was the last public complaint or comment Mrs. Hossack made about
her family life. 139 Professor Bryan adds: "Although they were to change
their testimony at trial, several of the Hossack children spoke at the
coroner's inquest and the grand jury hearing about continued quarrelling
between their parents during the final year."'' 40  Mrs. Hossack denied
there was any trouble at all in the entire marriage, let alone during the
126. State v. Hossack, 89 N.W.1077, 1078 (Iowa 1902).
127. Id. at 1079.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1077.
130- Id. at 1077-78.
131. Id. at 1078.






138. State v. Hossack, 89 N.W.1077, 1078 (Iowa 1902).
139. Id.
140. Bryan, supra note 93, at 1323.
[Vol. 112:1
THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF THE JUROR TO THE LAW
year after the reconciliation.' 4' Much was made of this denial.
42
Clearly, if the couple continued not to get along, this would give the
prosecution the "motive" they needed to convince the jury that Mrs.
Hossack murdered her husband.1
43
This focus on "motive" must have been what inspired Susan
Glaspell to invent the "dead bird" in A Jury of Her Peers.144 Legally,
spousal abuse on the husband's part would not have exonerated a wife
who killed him-nor, in itself, would it today. 145 Although the husband
may have been guilty of the crime of assault against his wife, at her trial
for his murder it would simply become the motive for her act. 146 That is
why Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters felt they had to get rid of the evidence of
his violence toward the bird, and thus, arguably, against her. Rather than
providing a foundation for an excuse defense-as it might today-it
would have been very good evidence for the prosecution as to motive.
Sentiment in the community ran largely against Mrs. Hossack
before and during her first trial. 147 She seemed to be a "strong" woman,
one who would not allow the male jurors to adopt their usual "chivalry
and paternalism" toward "helpless, weak and fragile" women. 148 Ann
Jones has convincingly argued that male jurors of that time were easily
persuaded that these latter described women were incapable of hating
"their husbands or marriage itself,'' 149 and thus, incapable of killing them.
Much is going on here; none of it easy to assess in thinking about
jury nullification. First, by definition, nullification depends upon jurors
concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime as charged, according to their own factual determinations and the
law as explained by the judge. 150 If male jurors exercise sympathy for
women through unselfconscious fear and stereotypical prejudice, the
result is not nullification, whatever else it might be.15 ' Given Mrs.
141. Id. at 1325.
142. Id. at 1339-40.
143. Id. at 1332.
144. Id. at 1308.
145. No worse abuse could be imagined than that inflicted on Judy Norman by her
husband; yet it was not enough to exonerate her. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d. 8 (1989).
The case has since been the paradigm for law reform in the area. See, e.g., Rosen, supra
note 105.
146. Bryan, supra note 93, at 1329-30.
147. Id. at 1328-29.
148. Id. at 1333.
149. Jones, supra note 113, at 98, 104, 106-08, 235-47; Bryan, supra note 93, at 1333,
n.221.
150. This definition is the conventional one. Irwin A. Horowitz, Norbert L. Kerr &
Keith E. Niedermeier, Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 66
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1207, 1208-09 (2001).
151. See id.
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Hossack's incredible story regarding the circumstances surrounding the
attack on Mr. Hossack, it is apparent that the Hossack jury simply
applied the law to facts reasonably found, quickly convicting her of
murder.152 After a reversal on two evidentiary grounds, a second jury
voted nine to three in favor of conviction. 1
53
There is no report of any debriefing of the three holdouts for
acquittal. 154 Thus, we do not know why they voted as they did. Public
sentiment, so strongly against Mrs. Hossack at the time of the first trial,
began to shift subtly in her favor from the day she was sentenced, only
five days after the guilty verdict. 155  Why? Professor Bryan offers
several possible reasons for the shift. 156 One newspaper suggested that
Mrs. Hossack was shielding another, maybe one of her children, and did
not actually commit the murder. 57 Some thought there were reasonable
doubts, considering "the circumstantial nature of the evidence."' 5 8 There
were some legal arguments to support this, of course. The appellate
court overturned the conviction as a result of two technical rulings on the
evidence, but these rulings did little damage to the prosecution's case. "9
No doubt some people "were affected by the unwavering support of
Margaret Hossack's children, who continued to proclaim their mother's
innocence even after the trial was over."' 160 Some "may even have begun
to acknowledge their own role in what had happened, admitting that they
had ignored the dangerous situation that they had known existed within
the Hossack household."' 6' Perhaps Susan Glaspell picked up on the
sentiment of guilt affecting this group, transferring and intensifying it in
the breast of Martha Hale. 62 The most obvious possibility is that many
people began to sympathize with Mrs. Hossack, who, by the time of the
second trial, was a broken woman who had been imprisoned for the last
year.163 One report summed it up this way: "The age of Mrs. Hossack
and the unhappiness of her married and home life has awakened
favorable sentiment among those who believe her guilty, but held the
circumstances to be extenuating."' 164 She was an abused woman, who for
152. See Bryan, supra note 93, at 1342.
153. Id. at 1355.
154. See id. at 1355-56.
155. Id. at 1345.
156. See id. at 1345-46.
157. Id. at 1345.
158. Bryan, supra note 93, at 1346.
159. See id. at 1346-48.
160. Id. at 1346.
161. Id.
162. Although speculative, it is a plausible conjecture.
163. See Bryan, supra note 93, at 1349-50.
164. Id. at 1355 n. 390 (quoting The Des Moines Daily Capital, Feb. 28, 1903).
(Vol. 112:1
THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF THE JUROR TO THE LAW
years cried out to the community for help.' 65 Finding none, she took
matters into her own hands. She had suffered enough. Her dead
husband was largely responsible for her suffering and her brokenness.
No good purpose would be served by jailing her. Professor Bryan tells
the rest of the story this way:
Margaret Hossack was not retried. Two weeks after the second trial
ended, the Board of Supervisors of Warren County, where the
Hossacks had lived, passed a resolution that it would not further aid
in her prosecution, stating its desire that the case be dismissed. The
county attorney of Madison County, where the second trial was held,
stated in a writing to the court that he believed Mrs. Hossack to be
guilty of the crime, but he knew of no new or additional evidence that
could be produced against Mrs. Hossack, making the 'result of
another trial.., very doubtful.' A year later, he amended his earlier
statement to the court, strongly requesting that the case be dismissed,
citing the lack of new evidence, the difficulty and cost of getting
witnesses to testify yet another time, the publicity surrounding the
two earlier trials, and the 'advanced years, and enfeebled condition
and appearance,' of Mrs. Hossack. According to his petition, the
case against Mrs. Hossack should be dismissed 'not because of the
innocence of the defendant, but because it will be impossible to
secure her conviction.'
166
If the law would not technically excuse her, the community would show
its mercy by letting her go, just as Mrs. Peters and Mrs. Hale, on behalf
of a silent and silenced community of her peers, 67 would forgive Mrs.
Wright and show her as much compassion as they could.
Is that enough? Is nullification justified because the jurors are
moved to compassion for one who has "suffered enough?" The answer
is "yes," but that is partly because there are two sides to the equation.
The first is that the defendant must truly "deserve" the pity bestowed
upon her. She deserves it because she has been a victim herself, one
unjustly subjected to a life of physical and mental suffering. 68 The other
side of the equation is that the victim of the homicide is the very
perpetrator of the offenses against her. 169 In other words, she deserves to
be pitied; and although he does not deserve "to be killed," (words that are
often used in these contexts), 7 ° he does not deserve to be the vehicle for
165. Seeid. at 1293, 1318-20.
166. Id. at 1355-56 (internal citations omitted).
167. See id. at 1317-19.
168. Evidence of her abuse at the hands of her husband was abundant. See Bryan,
supra note 93, at 1317-19.
169. See id.
170. Often, the claim of self-defense is a strong one. See Horowitz, supra note 150,
at 1226.
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the further infliction of suffering upon her. In short, he has done enough
to her. A duly empowered jury has the power to exonerate the Mrs.
Wrights and the Mrs. Hossacks of the world for mercy's sake, for the
sake of justice, or for any reason or no reason at all. I move now to the
moral right of a criminal jury to ignore the law. What justifies jury
nullification?
III. Jury Nullification
The moral argument for jury nullification has historically rested on
the proposition that jurors are entitled to disregard the law and their oaths
in order to do justice.17 1 This is consistent with the idea that citizens
generally have a moral right to disregard unjust laws, so long as a greater
harm is not done in the process. 172  Although consistent with the
proposition that the citizen has a right to disregard an unjust law, a juror
is a citizen with a special role and takes a special oath. Whatever
injustice the juror is grappling with, it is not to be contrasted with a
personal moral right. The juror is part of the community's formal
adjudicatory process, and so has a special responsibility to the law.
In the two abuse cases we have previously discussed, the "justice"
argument is couched in terms of the community's compassion for the
criminal defendant, herself a victim at the hands of the ostensible victim
of the crime. The killer is, therefore, forgiven; she has "suffered
enough." This is "justice" as a sensitive "fit," taking into account all the
particulars of a case rather than utilizing a strict rule. It deliberately uses
the idea of mercy or leniency in making the determination. Some may
think that mercy and justice are inconsistent notions, but, within any but
the most primitive legal systems, they are complementary ways of
making the rule of law work. In his book, Law and Literature,173 Posner
produces a long table of "legal antinomies," including law/justice,
law/equity, and law/mercy, which reminds us that the mix of rule and
discretion is, in itself, the very idea of Law.
174
Law is, however, an art, not a mathematical science. At the very
dawning of Western ideas of law, Aristotle introduced the idea of
"equity," a form of justice that corrects or completes the strict rule,
which sometimes fails due to its over or under inclusiveness. 175 Greek
171. "In essence, nullification empowers juries to appeal to fundamental principles of
justice over and above the written law." Abramson, supra note 3, at 61.
172. See Lawry, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
173. RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 93 (1998).
174. This is Law with a capital "L," as in the Rule of Law, rather than law, meaning
simply a "rule." Much debate in the history of jurisprudence is about such distinctions.
See LARRY ALEXANDER AND EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES (2001).
175. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 198-220 (Terence Irwin, trans., Hackett
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orators at the time urged juries to do justice in cases where the exact
letter of the law would produce injustice. 176 The idea is to pay closer
attention to all the particular facts of a case to see if a sympathetic
understanding of "human things" leads the decision-maker to modify the
rule, to fine-tune it, because rules are often too general and no rule-maker
can possibly foresee all the particular cases where the rule should not
apply. 177  Lex talionis for the ancient Israelites178 and dike for the
Greeks179 may have been a step forward from the days of
disproportionate vengeance, but, particularly as criminal law developed,
retribution itself seemed too crude an idea to match the ethical perception
that good people brought to bear on particular cases. 18 Contrasting "the
world of epiekeia or equity" to dike, Martha Nussbaum says that equity
"is a world of imperfect human efforts and complex obstacles to doing
well, a world in which humans sometimes also get tripped up by
ignorance, passion, poverty, bad education, or circumstantial constraints
of various sorts."'' 8 1  Strictly speaking, however, it is not the classical
Aristotelian doctrine of equity that is at play in matters of jury
nullification. Unlike the judge, the jury is ill equipped by training and ill
suited by role to make the fine legal distinctions necessary to depart from
a legal rule via a specific exception, which then takes its place as a new
legal rule in the development of doctrine. 182 No, the criminal juror's role
is to do justice in a single crude instance. It is more akin to clemency
given by the head of state. It is, in fact, mercy or clemencia, as Seneca
developed it. 183  It is mercy, particularized to the case at hand but
Publishing Co. 1985) (1881).
176. See Adriaan Lamni, "Verdict Most Just:" The Modes of Classical Athenian
Justice, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 277, 290-94 (2004).
177. See Aristotle's effusive description of the way "equity" should be understood in
his Rhetoric, reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 861 (1973) ("Equity bids
us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about
the men who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to
consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so
much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually
been.").
178. See Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice, in J.C. SMITH & DAVID N.
WEISSTUB, THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 241 (1983).
179. See Martha Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 83 (1993),
reprinted in LITERATURE AND LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING 19-23 (Paul J. Heald ed.,
Carolina Acad. Press 1998).
180. Id.
181. Id. at23.
182. This may or may not have been what Aristotle had in mind. Compare id. at 28,
with RICHARD WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 105-13 (1961). The alleged
genius of the development of the common law itself is said to have its foundation in the
idea that justice nudges rules to change case-by-case. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, The
Nature of the Judicial Process: Revisited, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 12 (1980).
183. See Nussbaum, supra note 179, at 30-34. Alan Scheflin and others have
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unarticulated for the most part, and surely not able to affect the law as
rule. Equity is part of the fabric of rule making, but mercy is part of the
checks and balances of a constitutionally healthy system. They are both
part of a legal system, but their exercise requires different qualities and
different rationales. The issue is one of role. What is the role of the jury
in the modem American criminal case?
The answer to that question is complex. We have already noted that
the jury's technical function is to find facts and apply the law to those
facts. The law is what the judge says it is. Nevertheless, there is a strong
tradition in the Anglo-American legal system that the criminal jury has a
function beyond the mechanical one described by Coke, as law for
judges and facts for the jury.184 Lord Devlin said: "Trial by jury is a
unique institution." It is not only "a protection against tyranny. It is that:
but it is also an insurance that the criminal law will conform to the
ordinary man's idea of what is just and fair. If it does not, the jury will
not be a party to its enforcement."' 185 We have examined two cases in
detail--one fictional, the other "real"--where ordinary people may well
have determined it would be unjust to further victimize two otherwise
innocent persons, who were themselves victims. Professors Mortimer
and Sanford Kadish summarize the tradition of such exercises in
nullification as:
The landmark cases.., in which the jury invoked its power to nullify
what were regarded as unjust laws, are invoked not as regrettable
departures from the rule of law, but as historic and seminal acts, like
the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights, by which men asserted their
right to be free of unjust laws.1
86
They added: "the fundamental function of the jury is not only to guard
against official departures from the law, but, on proper occasions, to
depart from unjust rules or their unjust application.' ' 87 Thus, Kadish and
Kadish argue that juries have the liberty to depart from the law, as
articulated by the judge in a criminal case, to free a defendant or lessen
the penalty, whenever important considerations of justice weigh heavily
in favor of doing so.' 88 Their choice of language is instructive here, they
convincingly argued that the very term "jury nullification" misstates what jurors do and
have done historically in the common law tradition. Modem critics deem the term "jury
mercy" more appropriate. Alan Schefflin, Mercy and Morals: The Ethics of
Nullification, in JURY ETHICS 155 (John Kleinig and James R. Levine eds. 2006).
184. See Harrington, supra note 4, at 438-39.
185. PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 160 (1956).
186. Mortimer S. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, On Justified Rule Departures by
Officials, 59 CAL. L. REV. 905, 920 (1971).
187. Id. at 919.
188. Id.
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are arguing that jury nullification is "justified" by the system itself (in
certain cases), while simultaneously lauding the judge's failure to notify
the jury that it has such power. They want to keep the argument within a
positivistic legal and systemic framework, but the subject is ambiguously
couched in moral terms. This is a problem Holmes wanted to solve by
banishing all moral words from the law. 189 However, it is practically
impossible to do so, and also undesirable to try, for criminal law is about
moral blameworthiness. 90 Moreover, law is about justice, at least
aspirationally. 191 Kadish and Kadish give a summary view, designed to
answer the question: "how is the conscientious juror to understand his
role?"
The duty of the jury is indeed to find the facts on the basis of the
evidence presented and to return a general verdict by applying those
facts to the law as given by the judge. This is the rule, and it imposes
an obligation to comply. But the obligation is not absolute.
Sometimes considerations of common sense, or considerations of
fairness to the defendant, or the jury's appraisal of the law in contrast
to the judge's statement of it may weigh so heavily that the jury may
justifiably deJpart from the rule requiring it to defer to the judge's
instructions.
Despite this summary answer, and the use of words like
"conscientious" and "justifiable" in describing the role of the juror,
Kadish and Kadish do not ask the moral question being asked here.
Instead they ask a "legal" question, one based on their attempt to
demonstrate that within the positivistic legal system itself, certain rule
departures are justified as "legitimated interpositions."' 93 It would take
us too far afield to engage their subtle and interesting thesis, and it is
unnecessary to do so. Proof that their quest is different from mine lies in
the example that they themselves give of a "legally" justified
interposition by a jury. First, they claim that a juror's decision based on
bribery or some "personal" interest "abuses his authority" and is not
justified; but then they assert that "a Southern jury that acquits a white
segregationist of killing a civil rights worker, on grounds that in the
189. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464
(1897).
190. See Hart, supra note 61.
191. After reviewing the history of jurisprudential thinking in the West, Carl Friedrich
notes that the relation of law to justice is of "central importance;" and adds that "justice
can be understood only if it is taken to be a state toward which the law is oriented as an
approximation." CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, 191 (1963).
192. MORTIMER S. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 66
(1973).
193. Id. at 66.
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public interest carpetbag troublemakers must be discouraged from
venturing into their community," is "an instance of legitimated rule
departure."'1 94  This result occurs because their thesis requires that a
justified rule departure must meet two criteria: (1) it must be effective,
and the official not accountable for the departure; and (2) "the system
must set up and make available to the agent who proposes to depart from
a rule some set of ends in virtue of which the departure from a rule may
truly be justified."' 95 It seems that, on its own terms, the argument fails
in those jurisdictions (the vast majority in the U.S.) where the judge
refuses to instruct the jury on nullification. It is only when such an
instruction is given, that it might be said that the system itself establishes
and makes available to juries the legal standards that allow juries-
without breaking the law-to depart from the announced rule.
Kadish and Kadish do not argue that the lack of a sanction on juries
alone is enough. The system itself must provide appropriate guidelines.
In the three states that presently allow juries to decide questions of law
by express constitutional provisions, courts theoretically must give an
appropriate instruction on that issue.196  Otherwise, the law is clear:
without such an instruction the jury does not have the legal right to make
such a determination. 97  Moreover, to find facts the jurors do not
actually believe to be true is also a violation of the jurors' oath. To fall
in line with the Kadish and Kadish thesis, this analysis would have to be
sculpted to fit their complex thesis. But the results of the analysis do not
indicate that they are correct; for surely there is no moral justification for
Southern juries to nullify murder convictions because the victims were
engaging in legitimate political conduct, disapproved on racist grounds
by the killers. Kadish and Kadish, of course, do not think they are
morally justified either. They simply are arguing that it was "lawful" for
those juries to behave that way. Nevertheless, the straightforward notion
that jurors have a legal, and therefore aprima-facie, obligation to comply
with the instructions on the law given by the judge is a clearer and
cleaner starting point. The further notion that jurors may depart from
those instructions in the interest of justice is the historic thesis that
morally justifies certain jury verdicts and condemns others. Calling
some of those departures from the law "legal" and not "moral" only
vaults us back into a jurisprudential debate that obscures more than it
194. Id. at 68.
195. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 186, at 931.
196. Schefflin claims-and he seems to be right-that the courts in Georgia,
Maryland and Indiana who do have such provisions, have all but read them out of
existence. He claims these are instances of "judicial nullification." See Schefflin, supra
note 183, at 144-46.
197. See id. at 131-42.
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clarifies. This point, I think, is made abundantly clear by examining the
decision in United States v. Dougherty, 98 wherein two articulate judges
stated the respective cases for and against allowing the judge to give an
instruction to the jury on nullification.
A. United States v. Dougherty: A Power Versus a Right
Defendants, anti-Vietnam war protestors, were prosecuted for "their
unconsented entry into the Washington offices of Dow Chemical
Company, and their destruction of certain property therein."' 99 They
were convicted on two counts of malicious destruction and acquitted of
burglary charges, but convicted also "on the lesser included offense of
unlawful entry., 200 Defendants appealed on three grounds, one of which
was that the judge had refused to instruct the jury on nullification or
allow lawyers to argue nullification to the jury.20' Although the case was
reversed on one of the other grounds, the court decided to address the
other two grounds in order "[t]o provide an appropriate mandate
governing the new trial. 20 2  Here, we simply focus on the jury
nullification issue.
Speaking for the majority, Judge Levanthal made it clear that,
because the jury could not be sanctioned for refusing to obey the judge's
instructions, it did possess a "prerogative-in-fact," not a legal
prerogative.20 3 Citing prominent authorities, the court acknowledged that
this power often was exercised in the interest of justice; but, often
201
enough, was used to counteract justice. It was equally clear that this
was a power not legally condoned.20 5 Roscoe Pound approved of a
certain amount of "jury lawlessness" because "the law is too often
mechanical at a point requiring nicety of adjustment., 20 6 Judge Learned
Hand had an occasional good word for it, reminding us that the power of
nullification "introduces a slack in the enforcement of law, tempering its
rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions.
207
198. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
199. Id. at 1116-17.
200. Id. at 1117.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1130. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
204. Among the authorities cited were Kalven and Zeisel, Roscoe Pound, Kadish and
Kadish, as well as a plethora of cases. Id. at 1130-1137.
205. As Judge Levanthal said: "The jury system provides flexibility for the
consideration of interests of justice outside the formal rules of law." Id. at 1137.
206. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130 n.32 (citing Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and
Law in Action, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910)).
207. Id. at 1130 n.34 (citing United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774,
775-76 (2d Cir. 1942)).
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Against these, and other statements in a similar vein, the court recites the
history of the change in the law in 19 th century America, from allowing
the jury to determine both law and facts to the present, nearly universal
rule that the facts are for the jury, the law for the judge.2 °8 The court also
points out the risk this power entails, citing equally impressive
authorities, including Pound again, this time to caution that nullification
can "hold up instead of uphold the law of the state., 20 9 The court then
offers some practical advice against the suggestion that the jury be told
of its power; and ends with a statement of its belief that the jury must
only exercise this power as a matter of its own "high conscience," and as
a matter of its "own initiative. '21° Understanding nullification as yet
another constitutional check on the exercise of power, the court
concludes that its rare use "may even enhance the over-all normative
effect of the rule of law."' 2 '
In dissenting from the majority's opinion on the issue of
nullification, Judge Bazelon agreed that the power is not a legal right.
"Nullification is not a 'defense' recognized by law," he argued, "but
rather a mechanism that permits a jury, as community conscience, to
disregard the strict requirement of law where it finds that those
requirements cannot justly be applied in a particular case." 212 Thus,
Bazelon does not disagree with Leventhal on the issue explored here.
They do agree that "nullification" acts as a check against governmental
abuse and gives effect to the conscience of the community. Their
disagreement comes only in the cost/benefit analysis as to whether
nullification would be abused more frequently once it has been
transferred into a discretionary right. Judge Bazelon suggests that an
instruction may not be necessary if the court would simply allow the
lawyers for each side to argue nullification to the jury.213 Perhaps, but
that would still leave the conscientious juror to debate whether to violate
his or her oath, a problem that the lack of instruction, according to Judge
Bazelon, exacerbates.214 It is not germane to my argument to venture
further into this interesting area. Sufficient for my purposes is the
understanding that, presently, when the jury engages in nullification, they
do so as an act of law-breaking. When that may be justified is, finally,
the question to be addressed.
208. See id. at 1132-34.
209. Id. at 1134 n.45 (citation omitted).
210. Id. at 1136-37.
211. Id. at 1137.
212. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1140 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
213. See id. at 1144 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. Id. at 1141 (Bazelon, .J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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B. Discretion and Role
If the law itself is unjust, or it is unjust when specifically applied to
the defendant, then the case may be made that a conscientious juror may
nullify. The jury has a unique role in the system. It provides a check to
ensure that only the truly blameworthy are convicted and sentenced to a
fair punishment. 1 5 Initially, the legislature sets the parameters for both
the definition of the offense and the punishment to be inflicted on an
offending party.21 6 Of course, the police have discretion not to arrest a
given offender. In his seminal study done in the early 1970's, Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis showed the wide variety of reasons why Chicago
police refused to arrest a person they had good reason to believe
217committed a crime. Often it was because the police abided by a
victim's request not to investigate.21 8 Sometimes it was a matter of using
the perpetrator as an informant to catch other criminals. 2 19  Informal
gatherings of family or friends may mean the officer does not arrest for
drunkenness or narcotics use.2 20 There are many reasons, sometimes
nothing more than personal sympathy, laziness, or a quick judgment that
it is simply "not worth it." Everyone assumes prejudice of one kind or
another sometimes affects these decisions. Davis was the first to suggest
that unchecked discretion of many actors in the criminal system was a
serious justice problem.22' Famously, the American Bar Association
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice lists a
number of reasons why a prosecutor "may in some circumstances...
decline to prosecute" without suggesting how this list might work in
making actual decisions.222  Of course, judges have discretion too; but
their discretion is more visibly exercised and more limited by rules and
by adversarial lawyers. In the famous Kalven and Zeisel study, jurors,
too, exercised discretion similar to that exercised by police and
prosecutors.2 23 However, unlike police or prosecutors, jurors are told
that they may not exercise discretion in freeing criminals or in
determining sentencing. They are law-bound.224  Arguably, there are
215. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in
the criminal law in this instance upon community participation in the determination of
guilt or innocence.").
216. Dressier, supra note 107, at 30.
217. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion 3-20 (1975).
218. Id. at 8-9.
219. Id. at 28-31.
220. Id. at 12-14.
221. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969).
222. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1992).
223. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 19, at 193-347.
224. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
good and not so good reasons why police, prosecutors, judges, and juries
exercise decisions not to enforce the criminal law.
In this article, I am examining only jurors, but it is important to see
that some reasons for other exercises of discretion by other officials in
the criminal justice system are impermissible. For example, prosecutors
sometimes do not prosecute certain offenses because they do not have
the resources to do so. 225 That option is not available to jurors, though,
as taxpayers and as persons exercising the community's conscience, they
may decide we are spending too much money incarcerating people. This
may cause them to nullify, thus freeing a defendant who might otherwise
have to serve jail time. But may they do so, ethically? I think not. At
least they should not for that reason, i.e., to save taxpayers money. They
may determine, as a matter of justice, that this particular defendant
should not serve jail time-and act accordingly. However, the decision
not to have the defendant serve time because, as a matter of good social
policy, we ought not to be spending so much money on incarcerating
criminals is not a matter within their capabilities, and not one within their
role. The juror's role is to focus on the individual defendant. 2 6 The
roles of the police and the prosecutor are different: they may take other
social policies into consideration when they choose not to arrest or not to
prosecute a criminal defendant.227 As we have seen, the role of the
criminal jury is to determine whether it believes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the prosecutor presented factual evidence that the defendant
violated the law as set forth by the court. 228 The moral leeway they have
relates solely to the issue of whether or not this particular defendant
should be convicted or should be convicted of this particular offense or
should suffer this particular punishment. Mercy for this defendant under
these circumstances is the moral issue. In other words, the jury room is
not the proper place to attempt to make or alter social policy. To show
with more particularly why this is so, let us examine the relatively recent
debate over race-based jury nullification.
225. A well-respected textbook on ethics for lawyers lists "resource constraints" as
one of the "[p]rinciplc reasons" why prosecutors do not prosecute certain crimes. See
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 371 (4th ed. 2004).
226. As the Supreme Court put it in Williams v. Florida: "(T)he essential feature of a
jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and
shared responsibility that results from that groups's determination of guilt or innocence."
399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
227. See Kenneth Culp Davis, supra note 219, at 80-96 (police) and 188-214
(prosecutors).
228. See Dressier, supra note 107, at 4-5.
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C. Race-Based Nullification
In a provocative article written in the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson
trial, Professor Paul Butler argued that, "for pragmatic and political
reasons, the black community is better off when some nonviolent
lawbreakers remain in the community rather than go to prison.2 29 He
says bluntly that, therefore, "[i]t is the moral responsibility of black
jurors to emancipate some guilty black outlaws., 230  His goal is "the
subversion of the American criminal justice system, at least as it now
exists."'23' His proposal is to advocate jury nullification by black jurors
in non-violent cases involving black defendants. He advocates three
rules for use by black jurors in criminal cases when the evidence
convinces the jurors that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
The first rule is to perform their duty in the usual way by convicting in
232
violent malum in se cases. A second rule is to engage in a
presumption of acquittal in cases involving nonviolent malum prohibitum
crimes.233 Thirdly, Butler suggests there should be no presumption,
either way, in cases of nonviolent malum in se crimes.234  Butler
particularly emphasizes jury nullification in so-called "victimless"
crimes, like possession of crack cocaine. Critics attacked both Butler's
assumptions and the largely utilitarian calculations he made in predicting
what the results would be if his proposals were adopted by the black
235community.
Citing much of the same evidence as Butler, and some additional
evidence, Andrew Leipold casts substantial doubt on Butler's assertion
that black Americans largely support the "radical critique" of the
criminal justice system, i.e., that "the justice system is irreparably racist,"
and therefore that most black Americans "believe that the current law
enforcement scheme is misdirected toward punishment, that too many
black defendants are being incarcerated (or are being over-incarcerated),
that criminal laws are unfairly administered, and that the political process
cannot be trusted to correct these problems. 2 36 Butler's own summation
of the radical critique itself is blunt. He says the criminal law is
fundamentally racist "because, like other American law, it is an
229. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 680.
232. Id. at 715.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 109, 112-13 (1996); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 299 (1997).
236. See id.
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instrument of white supremacy. '237 He thus blames this deep-seated
racism as the cause of criminal conduct by blacks. Randall Kennedy
suggests that Butler's reading of the criminal justice system is "static"
and "one-dimensional., 238  It is "totally at odds with what black
Americans need and want., 239 To Kennedy, Butler "perceives blacks as
occupying a place in the mind, soul, politics and law of America that is
essentially the same as that occupied by their enslaved or segregated
forebears., 240 These criticisms are devastating to Butler's case; but both
Leipold and Kennedy spend little additional time on assessing the moral
arguments that Butler offers. Instead, even granting him his assumptions
and premises, both of these critics move swiftly and cogently to demolish
the calculations Butler makes regarding what follows from adopting his
241proposals. I will not repeat the assessments on these matters made by
Leipold and Kennedy, but merely suggest that those interested in that
aspect of the debate read them. Instead, I want to look at Butler's moral
case in more detail.
To begin, Butler argues that the radical critique is true, and it
therefore follows that blacks have a special moral right to undermine the
system. There is a disconcerting ambivalence in the rhetoric Butler uses
in making his arguments. On the one hand, his position seems anarchic;
nothing less than "the subversion of American criminal justice" will do.
"Through jury nullification," he writes, "I want to dismantle the master's
house with the master's tools. ' 242  It is strikingly like a claim to
revolution, as if blacks were still literally enslaved. He likens the
country to a police state, "in which the problem lies not with the citizens
of the state, but rather with the form of government or law., 243 On the
other hand, when he comes to making his case for jury nullification
itself, the rhetoric is more nuanced. Indeed, he begins by saying: "Any
juror legally may vote for jury nullification in any case, but, certainly,
jurors should not do so without some principled basis. 244 He claims that
historical examples of nullification can be divided between those in
which the jurors "did the morally right thing" and those instances when
they did not, with history itself allowing us to decide which was
which.245
Admitting that "jury nullification is subversive of the rule of law,"
237. Butler, supra note 229, at 693.
238. KENNEDY supra note 235, at 299.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Leipold, supra note 235, at 132-140; Kennedy, supra note 235, at 301-3 10.
242. Butler, supra note 229, at 680.
243. Id. at 691.
244. Id. at 705.
245. Id.
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and "betrays rather than furthers the assumptions of democracy,2 46
Butler offers two reasons why black jurors have the moral right to nullify
in favor of black defendants. The first is that the Rule of Law is a
myth. 47 Here he cites the "indeterminacy thesis" of the critical legal
theorists to suggest that law is incapable of neutral application.248 This is
an odd argument in the context of jury nullification, for it suggests there
is no law for anyone to nullify. Indeed, if the judge's statement of law is
always the result of personal or cultural biases, then it stands to reason
that any juror's view is just as good or bad as that of any judge, and the
whole edifice crumbles. Of course, even prominent critics like Duncan
Kennedy249 do not really believe in the indeterminacy thesis. As it turns
out, Butler doesn't believe in it either. Quickly he slides away from
indeterminacy, and cites examples where flat out prejudice rules the day.
He begins with slavery. The laws of slavery were hardly indeterminate.
They were immoral because they treated a group of human beings as if
they were not human beings. Then he admits that "the rule of law
ultimately corrected some of the large holes in the American fabric;" but
continues by suggesting these corrections were simply evidence of the
law's "malleability," not its virtue. 250 Those legal developments are what
Kennedy and others offer as proof that unjust laws can be made just.2 5,
Indeed, change is not the same as the indeterminacy's malleability claim.
Butler contradicts himself in the very language he uses. He admits that
the rule of law did correct unjust law.252 So the rule of law can be
determinant and laws do sometimes change for the better.
It is Butler's second point that deserves more attention. Here his
claim is that "democracy" has betrayed blacks "far more than they could
ever betray it."'2 53 His first principle is one widely shared by many moral
philosophers: that there is "no moral obligation to obey an unjust
law., 254 He reminds the reader that this principle was a hallmark of
Martin Luther King Jr.'s leadership and of the many blacks "who
practiced civil disobedience during the civil rights protests of the 1950s
246. Id. at 706.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 707.
249. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
250. Butler, supra note 229, at 707.
251. As Randall Kennedy says: "Butler's account withholds completely any
recognition that restrictions on state power that define much of the constitutional law of
criminal procedure are limits that emerged from struggles against racism." Kennedy,
supra note 235, at 300.
252. Butler, supra note 229, at 707.
253. Id. at 706.
254. Id. at 708.
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and 1960s." '255  What follows, however, betrays a serious
misunderstanding of the concept and practice of civil disobedience, as
well as its misapplication to the traditions of jury nullification that Butler
himself has endorsed.
Regarding civil disobedience, Butler states "Martin Luther King
suggested that morality requires that unjust laws not be obeyed.,
256
Butler stops there, but Dr. King did not. It is true that King endorsed the
principle that Butler first endorsed: that there is no moral obligation to
obey unjust laws.257 However, King was working within a tradition (and
expanding that tradition) where law-breaking was to be done in a way
that actually attested to the allegiance of the law-breaker to the
community and to its laws; and that the manner in which the law-
breaking occurred put in play the possibility that the law-breaker himself
was wrong, even as it gave voice to the moral claim that, indeed, the law-
breaker was acting in the interests of justice.258 Civilly disobedient
citizens broke laws openly, non-violently, and were willing to accept
punishment at the hands of the state in order to attest to their allegiance
to the state and to their own moral positions. 59 It is not possible to
practice civil disobedience in the context of jury nullification. Moreover,
if the principles are to be applied to a new situation, then, it is incumbent
upon the one arguing for the application to make the case. Instead,
Butler blithely suggests that a black juror engages "in an act of civil
disobedience" when she acquits a black defendant, guilty of the crime on
the evidence, because she believes "there are too many black men in
,,260prison. In making this choice, "the juror makes a decision not to be a
passive symbol of support for a system for which she has no respect. 261
However, as Leipold convincingly argues, the "message" the juror sends
is hardly a clear one in most cases. 262 The public--even the judge and
lawyers-may not know this is the message being sent. Also, the
message is surely not sent clearly because Butler himself agrees that,
even under his three proposals, many black jurors would vote to convict
many black defendants.263 Again, this is not the way to send a message if
255. Id.
256. Id. at 708-09.
257. Dr. King cited both Augustine and Aquinas for the proposition. See Martin
Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham City Jail, in Civil Disobedience: Theory and
Practice 77 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1969).
258. See Lawry, supra note 2, at 708-18.
259. Id. at 715.
260. Butler, supra note 229, at 714.
261. Id.
262. See Leipold, supra note 235, at 127 ("[Blecause general verdicts in criminal
cases are opaque, any message that the jurors hoped to send can easily be lost.").
263. Butler, supra note 229, at 724-25.
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the message is intended to be effective at all.
What makes Butler's arguments so problematic is that he constantly
resorts to his "radical critique" assumption to support any position he
takes. 264 If the system is so bankrupt, so unjust to blacks-as it clearly
was in our country under slavery or in South Africa during the apartheid
years-then revolution itself would be justified, and the laws would have
no moral claim at all. Whether one obeys would simply be a matter of
strategy. However, Butler keeps talking specifics, trying to make a
moral case within a system he claims has no moral claim on black
citizens whatsoever.2 65 The traditions within which the arguments are to
be made are never taken seriously, because, in the end, he can always opt
out, due to his radical critique. This is true in the civil disobedience
analogy we just considered. It is more particularly true in the jury
nullification tradition directly, to which we now turn.
In the famous cases Butler cites, jury nullification occurred
primarily because the jury thought the law was unjust.2 6 6 Historically, to
this reason a second was added: even if the law itself is just, it had been
applied unfairly to this particular defendant. 267  Indeed, when jury
nullification is praised, these two reasons are sung like a mantra. In the
cases Butler proposes for nullification, the law itself is not usually
considered unjust. What Butler is complaining about is largely that "the
criminal law is unjust when applied to some antisocial conduct by
African-Americans: The law uses punishment to treat social problems
that are the results of racism and that should be addressed by other means
such as medical care or the redistribution of wealth., 268 These statements
themselves make controversial factual and political claims. More to the
point, this is not a mere indictment of the criminal justice system, but of
the entire fabric of a racist society. The criminal justice system is surely
not responsible for the unequal distribution of wealth in this country.
Moreover, when Butler claims the criminal law is unjust "when applied
to some antisocial conduct by African-Americans, 269 the natural
question is "which conduct?" How can you tell? If it is all the antisocial
264. Butler, supra note 229, at 693 (Black-on-black violent crime, and even
"victimless" crime like drug offenses, can be attributed to internalized racism).
265. Id. at 694 (Butler claims that "racism creates and sustains the criminal breeding
ground, which produces the black criminal. Thus, when African-Americans are locked
up, it is because of a situation that white supremacy created.).
266. Surely this is true in three famous cases Butler cites: Bushnell's Case (religious
freedom), the Zenger case (free speech and freedom of the press) and U.S. v. Morris
(fugitive slave case). See id. at 701-03.
267. Kalven and Zeisel "found that juries are most apt to nullify when they believe
the law itself is fair, but do not believe that this defendant deserves to be punished."
Leipold, supra note 235, at 124.
268. Butler, supra note 229, at 709.
269. Id.
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conduct, then, again, this is not an indictment of the criminal justice
system per se. It is a statement that blacks are not responsible for any of
their bad acts. Surely Butler doesn't mean that; yet, when he talks about
"Democratic Domination," it is, again, the argument that "majority rule
of whites over African-Americans is, morally speaking, illegitimate.
270
In one telling footnote, he actually dismisses any of the major arguments
for a general obligation to obey the law (fair-play, natural justice, or
social contract theory) by citing the "radical critique" argument.27' Still,
Butler persists in trying to make a case for moral legitimacy within the
context of democratic tradition, while simultaneously undermining those
traditions, when he finds it useful, by claiming a right to resistance that
would surely encompass all of the law.
Butler's proposals and the context in which they are made suggest a
deeper problem. Jury nullification is ill-suited to redress large social and
political injustices. Proponents of jury nullification are usually clear
about this matter. In Leipold's words: "[J]ury nullification is far better
equipped for doing individual justice than for carrying out a conscious
political campaign. 272 Finally, it is a question of role, which sharpens
moral questions and contextualizes them. Surely, the jury is not a
legislature. Even when the jury determines the law and the facts in a
case, it acts for that case only, and truly never "makes law." It simply
sometimes refuses to apply law. Thus, the notion that a jury can and
should grapple with complex legislative questions is absurd. Again,
Butler's claims that the opportunity to engage in meaningful political and
legislative activity is denied to blacks allows him to ignore this reality.
Kennedy and Leipold have shown why Butler's radical claim is
untenable. Moreover if Butler's claim is right, then the debate about jury
nullification has no context. It is just a question of the strategy one
chooses to dismantle the system.
IV. Conclusion
Jury nullification can be justified in cases where the law itself is
unjust or where convicting a particular defendant under particular
circumstances would be unfair. Case by case analysis, such as the kind
made in this essay in looking at A Jury of Her Peers and State v.
Hossack, is the only way to determine whether or not a particular
nullification is morally appropriate. Sending broad political messages,
270. d. at 710.
271. Id. at 709n.174.
272. Id. at 127.
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divorced from the facts of the case and the moral blameworthiness of the
particular defendant and the charge against him or her, is not justified
moral behavior for a juror.

